Abstract: The Supreme Court's trilogy of evidence cases, Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire appear to mark a significant departure in the way scientific and expert evidence is handled in federal court. By focusing on the underlying methods used to generate the experts' conclusions, Daubert has the potential to impose a more rigorous standard on experts. Given this potential, some individuals have called for states to adopt the Daubert standards to purge "junk science" from state courts. However, there is relatively little empirical support for the notion that Daubert affects the quality of expert evidence. Using a large dataset of state court litigation, we examine whether state adoption of the Daubert standards has a systematic effect on the observable characteristics of experts retained in civil cases. We find very little evidence in support of a significant Daubert effect. This is true even when we do a more detailed analysis of experts in products liability cases, an area of particular concern in the expert evidence debate. These results suggest that, at the state level at least, adoption of the Daubert standards has not led to increasing rigor in expert testimony.
1.

Introduction
Daubert
1 and its progeny, Joiner 2 and Kumho Tire, 3 appear to drastically change the way federal courts deal with scientific and, ultimately, all expert witness evidence. Moving away from the traditional Frye 4 test which focuses on whether the expert's testimony is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, 5 Daubert interprets Federal Rule of Evidence 702's reliability standard as requiring methodological soundness or rigor 6 rather than scientific consensus. By charging federal judges with this inquiry into the methods underlying the expert's claims, Daubert places those judges as gatekeepers with wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony.
In this article we present the first systematic analysis of the effects of state adoption of each of the three parts of the Daubert trilogy using a large representative dataset of trials across different case types. Specifically, we look at whether experts from various disciplines are introduced in the disputes as well as objective qualifications of the experts who are introduced as they relate to the state evidence rules. We find very little evidence that state adoption matters along either dimension. To provide a more complete picture of the effect of expert evidence rules in the products liability context, an area of particular concern to commentators and activists, we collect more detailed information on the experts offered in these disputes, again finding that adoption of the Daubert standards is of little consequence. While we are not able to determine whether these non-effects are due to inconsistent application of the Daubert standards at the state level or because Daubert itself is inconsequential relative to more general trends toward demanding greater rigor from experts regardless of the formal rule, our results do suggest that claims about the importance of Daubert are overblown.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background information regarding the Daubert trilogy; section 3 discusses the patterns of adoption of the federal standards in state courts; section 4 describes our data source and statistical identification strategy with results, including the products liability specific analysis, presented in section 5. After outlining the shortcomings of our study in section 6, we conclude.
2.
The Daubert Trilogy
Prior to 1993, federal courts applied a test of "general acceptance" to determine whether to admit scientific evidence as directed by the holding of Frye v. United States. 13 Under this test, courts simply asked whether the evidence represented the consensus view of the relevant scientific community or literature. However, in Daubert, the Court unanimously decided that Frye was no longer the standard for admissibility under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Noting that Frye was not mentioned in the drafting history of Rule 702, the Court declared the general acceptance rule to be too rigid.
14 However, the Court did not interpret Rule 702 as eliminating all constraints on admissibility of expert evidence. Instead, the Court stated that trial judges must ensure that expert evidence is both relevant and reliable according to Rule 702.
In determining reliability, the Court focuses on a Popperian view that defines science as the generation and testing of falsifiable hypotheses. 16 To guide trial judges, the Court lays out a number of criteria for determining reliability all of which relate to this underlying view of what constitutes science, namely rigorous empirical methods. Among the elements a trial court should consider when determining whether to admit scientific evidence are peer review and publication, which the Court notes increases the likelihood that methodological flaws will be discovered.
17
The Court also directs trial judges to consider the underlying method's error rate and fidelity to established methodological standards. Lastly, the Court does suggest that acceptance within the relevant scientific community can be considered in the admissibility decision, though it is not a sufficient condition for admissibility. 18 Above all, the Court stresses that the trial judge's analysis is a flexible one that must focus on methodological rigor and soundness of the underlying evidence to determine its reliability.
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Perhaps because of the Court's seemingly inconsistent aspirations for both a preference to remove barriers to the admissibility of expert evidence 20 and for methodological rigor 21 , questions arose as to whether the Daubert standard applied symmetrically to both the admission and exclusion of evidence, as well as in regard to what degree of latitude a trial judge has in questioning the connection between an expert's conclusion and the underlying method used to reach that conclusion. These questions were largely answered in Joiner which held that the Daubert standard applies symmetrically in decisions to both allow and exclude expert evidence. 22 Further, the Court stated that the trial judge in Joiner was operating within his gatekeeper capacity when he ruled that the experts in Joiner were merely speculating when they extrapolated the results of methodologically sound animal studies to support their conclusions regarding the effects of PCBs on the development of cancer in humans. 23 The decision in Joiner affirmed that the Daubert standard provides trial judges with wide latitude in making admissibility based on their own evaluation of the reliability of the underlying methods used to reach a scientific conclusion and their connection to the facts of the case before them.
The last part of the Daubert trilogy, Kumho Tire, clarified the domain of the Daubert analysis. Namely, in Kumho Tire, the Court makes it clear that a trial judge's focus on methodological rigor is not restricted to scientific evidence, but includes all expert evidence. 24 However, the Court does make it clear that the specific criteria laid out in Daubert are only 16 Ibid, 593. 17 However, the Court does note that publication and peer review work against innovative, though methodologically sound work, leading it to suggest that publication and peer review are informative but not necessary conditions for admitting evidence. 18 Comparable patterns were found for the likelihood that a judge would find the evidence to fail the reliability criteria. 35 Lastly, this pattern of increasing scrutiny appears to have peaked by
June 1997 (90 percent of evidence subjected to a reliability analysis), exhibiting a decline in the last two years of the RAND data (July 1997-June 1999). 36 In separate analyses by case type, the RAND researchers found that reliability scrutiny actually declined slightly for product liability and toxic tort cases in the two year period directly following Daubert although it increased in subsequent periods.
37
The RAND study finds slightly stronger support for the proposition that Daubert induced judges to scrutinize the relevance of an expert's testimony more closely. In the dataset, the RAND researchers find an unbroken upward trend in the likelihood that a judge addresses the issue of relevance with respect to expert evidence during the six years following Daubert. However, the likelihood that evidence is found to be unreliable exhibits significant variation with a rate at the end of the sample (July 1997-June 1999) that is virtually identical to that found at the beginning of the sample (January 1980-June 1989).
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The variability of these findings is puzzling in light of the conventional wisdom that Daubert led to stricter scrutiny. Perhaps, the very nature of statistical analyses makes it difficult to isolate subtle changes that are observed by participants in the underlying litigation such as attorneys and judges. Perhaps parties, induced by stricter scrutiny, find better experts, and this effect does not show up in trends regarding how frequently judges scrutinize testimony. That is, even though judges are not explicitly addressing reliability and relevance much more postDaubert, the fact that they are addressing it at comparable rates on a set of more qualified experts could imply that the system is more rigorous post-Daubert. This does not seem to be borne out in the data. The RAND study finds that the likelihood of an expert being found to be unqualified remains basically constant throughout the sample, 39 as does the likelihood a given expert exhibits objective indicators of quality. 40 In terms of ultimate outcomes, although the RAND study finds that parties more frequently requested summary judgment on the basis of shortcomings in the other side's expert evidence after the adoption of Daubert, the likelihood of such a request being granted was lower in every sample period post-Daubert than it was in the January 1980-June 1989 period.
41
Evidence of a Daubert effect at the state level is elusive as well. In a research approach mirroring the RAND study, researchers from the National Center for State Courts examined a sample of products liability cases 42 from the Delaware court system. 43 Delaware adopted the Daubert trilogy in 1999. The researchers found no difference pre and post Daubert adoption in terms of the likelihood of a motion to exclude an expert witness and in the likelihood of a summary judgment being entered, 44 although these results must be viewed with caution since the sample only includes 57 cases. 45 In addition to these case reviews, researchers from the National
Center for State Courts interviewed attorneys and judges from Delaware. Although these attorneys and judges claim that Delaware courts scrutinize experts more thoroughly post adoption, 46 the researchers conclude that the impact of the Daubert trilogy has been minimal in Delaware courts.
47
In a more comprehensive study of Daubert's effects at the state level, Cheng and Yoon employ a creative strategy whereby they examine the rate at which defendants request removal to federal court in tort cases as a function of whether the state in which the plaintiff files the case has adopted the Daubert standard. For a preliminary analysis, they focus on the Effectively, if Daubert has an effect on the admissibility of expert evidence that is beneficial to defendants, on average, defendants will attempt to remove their cases to federal court where Daubert is in force, unless the state of filing is also governed by the Daubert standard. In the Cheng and Yoon framework, if they observe that removal rates for cases in Connecticut state courts decline after May 1997, and there is no contemporaneous decline in New York state court cases, it is plausible that Connecticut's adoption of Daubert led to admissibility decisions that were more defendant friendly. However, if no such change is observed, confidence in that hypothesis is diminished.
Examining the period 1994-2000, they find that removal rates increase slightly in the Eastern District of New York after May 1997, while removal rates in Connecticut remain stable. While this is consistent with the hypothesis that Daubert changed admissibility standards in Connecticut, making those courts more defendant friendly, the effect is not statistically significant. 50 That is, while it appears as though Daubert is associated with Connecticut not following the more general trend (observed in New York) toward more removal, the effect cannot be distinguished from ordinary random variation in the data.
To expand their analysis, Cheng and Yoon examine data from 16 other state courts, eight of which adopt Daubert and eight of which do not, over the period 1994 to 2000. Examining the same outcome, removal rates for tort cases, the authors attempt to discover whether the Connecticut experience was a more general phenomenon. While they find a very small decline in the removal rate, on average, once states adopt Daubert, the effect amounts to a little more than one half of a percentage point and the effect is not statistically different from zero.
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While the Cheng and Yoon research design is very persuasive, their identification strategy relies on the assumption that only the defendants' decisions are affected by the change in evidence standards. If a non trivial fraction of plaintiffs prefer the Daubert standard, the case mix between federal and state courts will be different before and after Daubert is adopted, causing problems for the natural experiment framework.
For example, if plaintiffs systematically prefer the Daubert standard and defendants hold no preference, we would expect to observe Cheng and Yoon's results (i.e., no change in removal rates) as well, even though the implication would be very different than the conclusion they draw. While such a scenario seems unlikely given conventional views of Daubert, the more general point remains. Any deviation from the assumption that defendants prefer Daubert relative to plaintiffs limits the ability of Cheng and Yoon's test to identify Daubert's effect.
Further, given the aggregate nature of their data, they are not able to observe any effect heterogeneity across different kinds of torts cases or across different kinds of experts. For example, it could be the case that Daubert has a large effect in products liability cases alone but such a result might be interesting given the importance many commentators assign to products liability cases. Because Cheng and Yoon cannot distinguish among torts cases, they would not 50 Cheng and Yoon, supra note __, 489. 51 Cheng and Yoon, supra note __, 497. be able to detect such an effect because products liability cases make up a relatively small fraction of total torts cases. Lastly, Cheng and Yoon are not able to examine whether the other parts of the Daubert trilogy have any effect given their sample.
To confront these limitations of the Cheng and Yoon study, we adopt a complementary approach that uses a large scale dataset containing dispute specific information to examine the effect of state adoption of the Daubert trilogy. Further, by focusing on the characteristics of the experts offered in these disputes, we avoid having to make assumptions about which side in a dispute is more likely to prefer a given evidence standard.
Trial Data and Statistical Approach
We examine data from the Jury Verdict Research (JVR) Company which collects data on cases, both tried and settled, from state courts throughout the country. 52 Although the JVR is not a random sample, the biases identified in the JVR do not appear to be related to case attributes that correlate with which expert witnesses are used. 53 From the text file for each case in the database, we extracted information on the experts offered by both sides in the dispute. Of interest for this study, the information includes the expert's field of expertise and whether the expert includes a graduate or professional degree in his or her title. We examine cases between 1990 and 2003. Table 2 provides the break-down of cases by year in our sample. In total, we examine 9,125 cases that span every state with the distribution shown in Table 3 . Given that the average case in our sample has 1.53 experts we have 14,048 expert-case observations. We examine regressions analyzing the relationship between the likelihood that an expert from a given field 54 is put forth in a case and whether the state where the case is filed has adopted Daubert, Joiner, and/or Kumho Tire, controlling for state and year fixed effects. 55 The state fixed effects net out any state-to-state heterogeneity in the baseline use of various experts, while the year fixed effects capture any universal changes over time. We also examine the likelihood that an expert has a Ph.D. or some other degree listed, in the same framework. In addition to analyzing data from the full JVR sample, we examine case type specific data to determine whether there is any effect heterogeneity across different kinds of cases. We estimate probit models, meaning that our dependent variable in each case takes the value of zero (i.e., expert not offered) or one (i.e., expert offered). These models allow us to interpret the resulting coefficients as the change in probability associated with the adoption of a given evidence standard. 56 We also include control variables for the severity of the injury (major, minor, death, and emotional injuries (without a physical injury)). In addition we include controls for the types of cases: sexual assault, sexual harassment, wrongful termination, premises liability, railroad liability, government liability, police liability, employer liability (excluding wrongful termination), medical malpractice, bad faith, auto case, product liability, aircraft liability and legal malpractice. These case type controls allow us to account for differences in the baseline likelihood that a given expert is offered in a particular kind of case.
This kind of analysis has the potential to highlight important changes brought about by Daubert's focus on methodological rigor. For example, because methodological rigor is often stressed in fields where the terminal degree is a research doctorate (e.g., Ph.D.) as opposed to a taught degree (e.g., M.D.), if adoption of Daubert really leads to a focus on methodological rigor, we might expect to see a significant decline in the likelihood that a medical doctor is offered in a case as opposed to a toxicologist with a Ph.D.
What Happens when States Adopt Daubert?
Before presenting the regression results, in Table 4 , we provide the means and their associated standard errors for the likelihood that each kind of expert appears in cases in state by year cells where the Frye (or some other non-Daubert) standard is in force (columns i and ii) and where the Daubert standard applies (column iii). Column ii restricts attention to only those states that eventually adopt Daubert. That is, these are the means while Frye (or another non- 54 We restrict attention to those fields for which a non-trivial number of experts appeared in the full JVR dataset. 55 We do not examine cases in which no expert testifies. It is unclear if the absence of a listed expert in the JVR data reflects no expert testimony in the case or an omission in the reported case. In results not shown we find similar results when we estimate the models treating those cases without reported experts as having no expert testimony. 56 We present the marginal effects of each variable estimated at the sample mean. Our results are robust to using a linear probability model or logit model. Daubert standard) governs in states that later switch to Daubert. This column provides some insight as to whether those states that eventually adopt Daubert are somehow different than other states with respect to expert evidence, helping to flag any sample selection or endogeneity problems with treating any differences associated with adopting Daubert as being causally related to the use of the Daubert standard. In general, these unconditional means provide some evidence about the differences generated by the adoption of Daubert and provides context for interpreting the regression results that follow. While there are no particularly remarkable findings in Table 4 , especially relative to the underlying variation in the data, the specialties seem to fall roughly into three categories. In each case, the likelihood of an expert of a given specialty being offered in a case is lower in states that eventually adopt Daubert during the pre-adoption period. Once Daubert is adopted, the likelihood stays lower than non-Daubert states for: neurologists/neurosurgeons; psychologists; dentists; economists; vocational experts; engineers; and accident reconstruction experts. Among those specialties where eventual Daubert states converge to the mean likelihood observed in non-Daubert states are: surgeons; psychiatrists; medical doctors; doctors of osteopathy; podiatrists; and attorneys. Lastly, the specialties where the mean likelihoods observed in eventual Daubert states increase after adoption to exceed the likelihoods observed in nonDaubert states are: chiropractors; nurses; epidemiologists; accountants; and toxicologists. Similar (though not identical) patterns emerge when we examine the means separately for medical malpractice cases (Table 5) , automobile cases (Table 6) ; products liability cases (Table  7) , and premises liability cases (Table 8) . While the results in Tables 4-8 are descriptively interesting primarily because they do not show any strong Daubert effect (at least relative to the underlying variation in the data), the implicit comparison could be misleading if there are general background trends in the data that are obscured by looking only at the unconditional means. To control for these effects, we examine regressions that control for year fixed effects as well as idiosyncratic state fixed effects.
We first present regression results using the entire JVR sample in Table 9 . Each row represents a separate regression where we examine the likelihood that each kind of expert is offered in the case as a function of the adoption of the various parts of the Daubert trilogy, controlling for state and year fixed effects. The coefficient in each column represents the change in likelihood that each kind of expert is offered associated with state adoption of each of the parts of the trilogy.
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While most of the coefficients cannot be distinguished from zero, we find a few potentially interesting associations. For example, the likelihood of using a psychologist as an expert appears to decline with the adoption of Daubert, though much of this effect is undone once Kumho Tire is adopted. A similar pattern is observed with economists and toxicologists. In general, we find that the effects of each part of the Daubert trilogy are not all of the same sign for a given specialty. Given this, it is useful to examine the net effect of adopting any part of the trilogy. These results are presented in Table 10 . Again, although most of the effects are not distinguishable from zero, there are some exceptions. Psychologists are less likely to be offered as experts if a state adopts some part of the trilogy, although this result may be an artifact of selection bias since it disappears if we restrict attention to only those states that eventually adopt Daubert. Doctors of Osteopathy also appear to fare poorly once some part of the Daubert trilogy is adopted, and this result largely survives (though the effect is smaller in magnitude) if we restrict the sample. 0.000 (0.001) Note: Each row represents the marginal effects from a separate regression including state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by state to allow for dependence of observations across time. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 . All p values are defined relative to the two sided hypothesis that the effect of adopting the given standard = 0.
To examine objective measures of the quality of experts offered, we also exploit the fact that the JVR includes information regarding whether the expert includes an indication of academic credentials in her title. Given the limitations inherent in the JVR documentation, it is not possible to know how complete this information is, but there is no obvious reason why inclusion of this information should systematically vary with the evidence rules in a state, suggesting that no bias should arise due to incomplete information in this regard.
Given the focus of Daubert on methodological rigor, we might expect that adoption is associated with a higher likelihood of an expert having a Ph.D. since methodological training is generally a component of a Ph.D. program. We find no systematic effect of state adoption of any part of the trilogy on the likelihood of the expert listing a Ph.D. This is true whether we examine all of the states or just those that eventually adopt Daubert. We find the same result when we look at the presence of any academic or professional degree in the expert's title.
Because we have limited confidence in the completeness of the JVR's inclusion of academic and professional degrees, we engaged in further data collection regarding the experts' characteristics. While it would be infeasible to track down the thousands of experts who appear in the JVR dataset, it is possible to put together this information for a subset of cases. We focus on products liability cases given the special importance commentators have assigned Daubert in the products liability context. 58 at a top ten university as defined by US News and World Reports; 4) years of experience in the field; and 5) whether the expert has any academic publications on her curriculum vitae. While none of these pieces of information is a perfect proxy for an expert's qualifications, each likely exhibits a positive correlation with quality. We examine these outcomes in the same regression framework used above. Items 1, 2, and 4 are analyzed as binary outcomes allowing us to interpret the resulting coefficients as the likelihood that there is an expert in the case exhibiting each criterion. Years of experience are included as an integer outcome where the regression relates the adoption of the evidence standard to the years of experience the offered expert has. Each regression includes year and state fixed effects, and results are presented in Table 11 with each row representing a separate regression.
Once again, we find relatively little by way of a systematic effect of Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire on experts. Daubert itself does appear to make it more likely that an expert has been educated at a top ten university, but its adoption is also associated with a lower likelihood that the expert is currently affiliated with a top ten university relative to the non-Daubert standards. This may reflect a combination of an increasing need for methodological rigor as provided by the top graduate programs but a reduced reliance on prestigious affiliations as opposed to the quality of an expert's work in terms of certifying herself as an expert. Both of these results survive if we collapse the adoption variable into a single indicator of whether the state has adopted any part of the trilogy. Standard errors are clustered by state to allow for dependence of observations across time. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 . All p values are defined relative to the two sided hypothesis that the effect of adopting the given standard = 0.
Caveats
Empirical work with litigation-related data suffers from a number of problems, and this study is no different in this regard. As pointed out in our review of litigation data with Tabarrok, existing civil litigation datasets are deeply flawed. 60 With respect to the JVR data in particular, there is evidence that coverage of cases and settlements differs from area to area, and, most likely, this variation is not random. 61 Although we have no reason to believe that inclusion of cases in the dataset is systematically related to state expert evidence rules, we cannot rule out the possibility that our results suffer from sample selection bias. Another source of potential sample selection bias arises from which cases list the parties' experts and which do not. Because of the limited documentation regarding JVR's data collection methods, we cannot be sure that our dataset captured all of the offered experts in the cases included in the JVR dataset. Again, we have no prior indication that experts are missing in a non-random way that could bias our results, but the limited documentation precludes us from investigating this point more completely.
Another source of bias that might arise involves the fact that cases are not randomly distributed across states or across courts within a state. Given this, using pre-Daubert cases within a state or contemporaneous cases in non-Daubert states as our counterfactual or control group may not be justified. If these control cases are systematically different in terms of characteristics that also affect which experts are offered in a case, then the means and regressions we present above cannot be interpreted causally.
Further, even for our more detailed products liability, our quality proxies are very rough. For example, while it may be true that trilogy adoption has no effect on the likelihood the expert has published in an academic journal (as our results suggest), perhaps a better quality-adjusted publication measure would exhibit a systematic relationship with the adoption of Daubert.
Given these problems, it is appropriate to ask what value our results provide. As described above, state adoption of Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire has generated significant interest from academic commentators, legal professionals, and activists on both sides of the issue. Empirical evidence is necessary to guide the debate and to craft optimal legal rules. Unfortunately, the relevant data are in short supply. However, it is interesting that multiple research designs, including the Cheng and Yoon removal-focused strategy and the more exhaustive case study approaches of the National Center for State Courts and the RAND Corporation, all generate qualitatively similar conclusions. Although each study is far from perfect, they are not duplicative in their shortcomings, so it is unlikely that they are all being driven by the same kind of bias. Once this point is recognized, it becomes easier to place confidence in the weight of the evidence, even if no individual study provides a decisive answer regarding the effect of adopting Daubert in terms of how rigorously experts are scrutinized.
7.
Conclusion
The Daubert trilogy creates a new standard for determining the admissibility of expert evidence in federal courts. With its focus on methodological rigor, many tort reformers trumpet the Daubert standards as a way to get rid of junk science in the courtroom. Conventional wisdom holds that Daubert led to stronger scrutiny of expert evidence in the federal courts, seemingly supporting the tort reformers' view. This has led to a related effort to encourage state courts to adopt the Daubert standard. Despite all of these efforts, as well as the efforts of those opposing adoption on the grounds that Daubert is overly restrictive, there is virtually no systematic evidence supporting the view that adoption of Daubert makes any difference at all.
Because the existing evidence either focuses on the federal courts or a very limited range of state courts, we examine this issue using a large dataset that spans almost every state over a wide range of civil case types. In this more comprehensive analysis, we too find very little evidence that adoption of the Daubert trilogy has any systematic effect on who is offered as an expert in state court disputes. This is true even when we examine more detailed data in the area of products liability disputes where Daubert is thought to be particularly important. While we cannot determine exactly why Daubert seems to have no systematic effect, our results are consistent with other empirical studies on this topic. While none of these studies is perfect, their imperfections are largely orthogonal to each other, making it unlikely that design flaws or data limitations are driving this non-effect. While courts may be scrutinizing expert evidence more carefully, as suggested by the RAND research at the federal level, it seems unlikely that this has anything to do with Daubert per se.
